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I
INTRODUCTION TO CONSUMER CREDIT INSURANCE
Consumer credit insurance may be classified under two broad headings: credit
life insurance and credit accident and health insurance. Credit life insurance
generally provides a death benefit large enough to repay the creditor the out-
standing balance of the indebtedness at the time of the debtor's death. Credit acci-
dent and health insurance guarantees that the debtor's periodic payments will be
met if he is incapacitated because of injury or illness.
Both types of insurance may be used only in connection with credit extensions
which are repayable within a specified number of years. Insurance is ordinarily
obtained by the borrower at the point where the credit transaction takes place-that
is, from a financial institution or a vendor. The borrower may be covered under
a group policy or by an individual contract, and, in either case, the creditor is the
primary beneficiary of the insurance.
A. Origin and Development
Consumer credit insurance in the United States is an outgrowth of the credit life
insurance policies first written in 1917 by the Morris Plan Insurance Society, which
was established by Arthur J. Morris, founder of the "Morris Plan" banks or com-
panies. Each individual policy was written in an amount sufficient to pay the loan
should the borrower die before repayment was made. From this beginning evolved
the basic principle of consumer credit insurance that a man's debts ought not to
outlive him.
Since 1945, the increase in consumer credit insurance in force has roughly paralleled
the increase in the dollar volume of consumer indebtedness. With the rapid growth
in recent times in the use of credit by consumers, especially in the various types of
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installment financing, consumer credit insurance has become the fastest growing
segment of the insurance industry. Approximately $67 billion of credit life in-
surance was in force at the end of 1967, compared with less than a half billion
dollars in 1945.1 This increase in the volume of credit life insurance has been
accompanied by a corresponding increase in the percentage of consumer indebtedness
covered by insurance. In 1945, approximately seven per cent of total consumer bor-
rowing was protected by credit life insurance; in 1967 this figure had risen to about
sixty-seven per cent.2 Although comparable data for credit accident and health
insurance are not available, the outstanding volume and penetration of this type
of credit insurance is much lower than that of credit life insurance. However, data
on premium volume indicate that credit accident and health insurance has grown
more rapidly than credit life insurance in recent years.
B. Characteristics of Credit Life Insurance
Most credit life insurance in force is decreasing-term life insurance sold at a flat
premium rate on a group basis with a minimum of underwriting limitations.
Although credit life insurance may be obtained on a group or individual basis, group
insurance is far more prevalent. About eighty-six per cent of the credit life in-
surance in force at year-end 1967 was group insurance.4
Group insurance is issued to the creditor by the insurance company; the creditor
becomes the policyholder and enrolls the debtor. The borrower receives a certificate
which describes his insurance coverage. Since the insurance company does not
select the applicants and a medical examination is not ordinarily required, the
availability of insurance is determined by the creditor agreeing to grant credit. A
majority of the insurance companies impose underwriting limitations with respect to
the amount of coverage and the maximum age. Additional limitations may be
imposed in the application for insurance or may be imposed under the laws of the
various states.
When credit life insurance is obtained under an individual policy, the borrower
is issued a policy by an agent of the insurance company. The insurance company
generally relies on an employee of the creditor acting as agent to sell this type of
insurance. Since both types of insurance are marketed through the same channels
using similar mass handling techniques, the risk exposure of the insurer is the same.
Credit life insurance is ordinarily of the decreasing-term type since it is almost
t INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FaCT BooK 33 (1968) [hereinafter cited as i968
LIFE INSURANCE FACT BooK].2 The percentage of coverage is calculated from data on consumer credit outstanding in 54 FED. Rvs.
BULL., No. ii, at A-5a (1968), and from data oa credit life insurance in force in x968 Lis'E INSURANCE
FACT Boox, supra note z. The percentage of outstanding consumer credit that is insured is somewhat
overstated because the credit life insurance total includes an unspecified amount of mortgage protection
insurance issued through lenders plus an unspecified amount of protection on agricultural loans.
'See, THE SPECTATOR, October issue for various years.
& 1968 LiFa INSURANCE FACT BooK.
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always issued in connection with installment debt contracts. As the debt is reduced
through the payment of periodic installments, the amount of insurance coverage
is reduced concurrendy. In this way, the amount of insurance remains approxi-
mately equal to the scheduled amount of the unpaid indebtedness. Level-term credit
insurance is used in connection with single-payment loans to provide full insurance
coverage during the life of the loan.
The premiums paid for credit life insurance are not usually based on the age
distribution of the insured debtors. Instead, a flat premium rate applicable to all
borrowers of any one creditor is ordinarily used. The cost of credit life insurance
is borne by the debtor; the charge may be separately identified, or it may be included
as part of the total financing charges. In either case, the creditor remits the premiums
to the insurer.
C. Characteristics of Credit Accident and Health Insurance
Credit accident and health insurance in most respects resembles credit life in-
surance. Credit accident and health insurance, like credit life insurance, may be
obtained on a group or individual basis. It is sold through the same institutions,
using the same techniques; the premiums are remitted to the insurer by the creditor;
and the borrower generally pays the cost of the insurance.
There are differences, of course. If the borrower becomes disabled, the monthly
installments are paid by the insurer only for the duration of the disability or until
the maturity date of the loan, whichever occurs first. In addition, underwriting
conditions are necessarily stricter than in the writing of credit life insurance.
Normally a maximum is placed on the amount of the periodic payments made on
each insured credit transaction by the insurer to the creditor beneficiary. If the
borrower had been disabled within some specified period prior to becoming insured,
benefits are ordinarily not payable if the condition recurs. The borrower may be
required to be gainfully employed in order to secure insurance.
Credit accident and health benefits are not payable unless the insured debtor
remains continuously disabled for a specified waiting period as defined in the
policy. If the disability ceases prior to the expiration of the waiting period, no
benefits are paid. Benefits may either be retroactive or nonretroactive. If they are
retroactive, benefits will be paid from the first day of the disability, provided the
period of the disability exceeds the waiting period. If benefits are nonretroactive,
they will be paid only for the period of disability beginning with the end of the
waiting period.
The differences between credit life and credit accident and health insurance
result from the disparities in the degree of exposure assumed by the insurer-the risk
of death versus the greater risk of accident or illness. Consequendy, the problems
of rate setting, administration, and regulation in credit accident and health insurance
are even more complicated than they are for credit life insurance.
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PUBLIC CONCERN AND REGULATION
During the years of rapid growth in consumer credit insurance, there also
developed public concern about some industry practices which were thought to be
unfair and, in a few instances, abusive. This concern was publicly acknowledged in
1948 when the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (the NAIC)
appointed a subcommittee for credit life and accident and health insurance.5 The
practices which attracted attention at that time included excessive insurance,
pyramiding of insurance coverages, overcharging, coercion, and nonpayment of
claims.6 After studying the problems then afflicting the industry, the first draft of
the NAIC Uniform Consumer Credit Insurance Rules and Regulations (the "Rules
and Regulations") was submitted in 1952. These rules were adopted by the NAIC
in June, I954.
Public concern was further indicated in 1954 when the Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee investigated the tie-in sale of
consumer credit insurance in the small-loan industry.Y The interest of the sub-
committee was particularly noteworthy since Congress had nine years earlier passed
the McCarran Act, which exempted insurance from antitrust legislation and allowed
the states to continue regulating insurance but which at the same time made it clear
that Congress would examine state statutes in order to determine the effectiveness of
state regulation.'0
Although the NAIC Rules and Regulations, if properly enforced, could have cor-
rected the abuses practiced at that time, they were not widely adopted by the states
because they did not provide insurance commissioners with the power to regulate
premium rates. Ultimately, the Rules and Regulations did serve as the foundation
for the formulation of the NAIC's Model Bill for the Regulation of Credit Life and
Credit Accident and Health Insurance (the "Model Bill") adopted in December
1957.1" As enacted in the various states, the Model Bill was the first major reform
in consumer credit insurance. It differed from the Rules and Regulations in that
it gave to the state insurance commissioner a full statutory authority to regulate
I Address of NAIC President J. Edwin Larson, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE CoMMISSIoNERs,
1949 PROCEEDINGS 19-20 [hereinafter cited as NAIC 19- PROCEEDINGS].
I Larson, Problems of State Regulation, 413 INS. L.J. 327 (1957)-
7Proposed Rules and Regulations Governing the Sale of Credit Life and Credit Accident and Health
Insurance, NAIC 1952 PROCEEDINGS 766-73.
'Report of the Credit Life and Credit Accident and Health Subcommittees, 2 NAIC 1954 PRO-
CEEDINGS 299-309, 335.
'SuBcOsfss. ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY OF THE SENATE CoMMs. ON THE JUDICIARY, 83D CONG., 2D
SEss., REPORT ON THE TIE-IN SALE OF CREDIT INSURANCE IN CONNECTION WITH SMALL LOANS AND OTHER
TRANSACTIONS (Comm. Print 1955).
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-13 (1964).
1 1 Report of the Committee on Insurance Covering All Installment Sales and Loans, I NAIC 1958
PROCEEDINGS 104. The current version of the Model Bill, revised December i960, appears in i NAIC
1961 PROCEEDINGS 300 [hereinafter cited as MODEL BILL].
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consumer credit insurance, including the power to "disapprove any [policy] form if
the benefits provided therein are not reasonable in relation to the premium charge."' 2
III
STATUTORY REFO1Rss: A COMPARISON
Corrective legislation has evolved or is evolving to control the principal abusive
practices which were and are of concern in the consumer credit insurance industry.
This legislation is a combination of (a) existing state laws, for the most part based on
the NAIC Model Bill, (b) the recently enacted, but not yet effective, federal Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act (the "CCPA"), and (c) the recently promulgated Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code (the "UCCC"), which is just coming before state legis-
latures.
There is ample justification for considering the NAIC Model Bill as the standard
of existing state legislation. Thirty-one states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico have enacted it in substantially the form recommended by the NAIC.3 Fur-
thermore, the insurance commissioners of six additional states have promulgated
regulations patterned substantially after the Rules and Regulations adopted by the
NAIC in 1954, which became the basis for the Model Bill. 4 Three additional states
have statutes which, by vesting broad regulatory authority in the insurance com-
missioner, are tantamount to the Model Bill provisions" The remaining ten states
have only limited consumer credit insurance regulation; in three of these states,
either the maximum allowable premium rate is set by statutes governing small loans
or the authority to set the rate is granted by lending laws.10 Because the majority of
the states have enacted legislation or adopted regulations similar to the NAIC Model
Bill, to date it represents the major reform actually put into practice in the field of
consumer credit insurance.
The CCPA, passed by the Congress in May 1968 and signed into law by the
President on May 29, 1968,"7 is the culmination of what began as a "Truth-in-Lending"
bill in i96o. The CCPA is divided into four tides. Title I deals with consumer
credit cost disclosures and has been given the short title of the "Truth in Lending Act."
Chapters 2 and 3 of Title I pertain to the disclosure of credit insurance premiums and
will be discussed below with the disclosure requirements of the UCCC and the NAIC
" Report of Committee on Insurance Covering All Installment Sales and Loans, i NAIO 1958 Pito-
CEEDINGS 104, I1O.
"
8 The thirty-one states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Vermonit, Virginia (excludes § 7.B), Washington, and Wyoming.
"The six states involved are Alabama, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Tennessee.
"These states are New York, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
"e The maximum permissible rate is set by a small loan statute in Massachusetts, while in Louisiana
and Mississippi authority to establish a maximum rate is granted regulatory officials by lending laws.
1' 82 Stat. 146 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CCPA].
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Model Bill. The other titles of the CCPA deal with "extortionate credit transac-
tions" (i.e., loan sharking), wage garnishments, and the creation of a National Com-
mission on Consumer Finance.
The UCCC was promulgated at the 1968 annual meeting of the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It was prompted by the recogni-
tion of the unfortunate state of consumer credit regulation, which featured wide
variations among the states and seriously inconsistent and unintegrated legislation
within each state. Meeting the rapid growth of consumer financing with only
piecemeal legislation, the states had produced a regulatory framework that differed
for each type of creditor and often even for different types of goods and services
procured on credit. The resulting chaos prompted a threat of federal legislation-
and ultimately enactment of the CCPA-and this threat also generated the effort to
develop the UCCC.
The UCCC's main reliance is not on more regulation but on improving competi-
tion as a means of providing increased consumer protection. By requiring uniform
disclosure, which would permit credit users to shop more effectively for terms,
and by promoting greater freedom of entry into the consumer finance industry, the
UCCC embodies the preference for a more competitive economic market for con-
sumer installment credit. The preference for disclosure as a stimulus to competition
is reflected in the Code's article 4 governing consumer credit insurance, but addi-
tional regulatory steps are also taken in this area. This section of the paper is
devoted to showing how the UCCC and the disclosure provisions of the CCPA are
related to the NAIC Model Bill. The final section of the paper examines the
controversy surrounding premium rate regulation, a matter that is not resolved by any
of the three acts.
A. Basic Coverage
Although there are many similar provisions, the UCCC and the NAIC Model
Bill do not overlap because, by the Code's express declaration, they are henceforth
to be regarded as directed toward different parties in the consumer credit insurance
transaction' The Code sets forth the relationship as follows:
This Article supplements and does not repeal the Credit Insurance Act [the Model
Bill]. The provisions of this Act concerning administrative controls, liabilities,
and penalties do not apply to persons acting as insurers, and the similar provisions
of the Credit Insurance Act do not apply to creditors and debtors.' 8
This provision of the Code is more than merely descriptive. It is ipso facto a change
in the Model Bill's coverage. Its effect is to nullify those provisions of the Model Bill
that expressly apply to creditors and to make the Code's provisions the exclusive rule
as to creditors' practices with regard to credit insurance. This legislative legerdemain
" UNIFORM CONSUAER CREDIT CODE § 4.102(3) [hereinafter cited as UCC]. On the text of the
UCCC, see Foreword, in this symposium, p. 639 n.I.
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serves the intended useful purpose of collecting the law of consumer credit in one
place but has also the perverse effect of altering the clear sense of existing legislation
without formally amending it.10 This circumstance seems to have no major sub-
stantive significance, however, as the UCCC incorporates all of the Model Bill's
provisions formerly governing creditors' practices.20 In addition, the UCCC goes
beyond the Model Bill and contains special provisions for the regulation of con-
sumer credit insurance on revolving credit sales accounts and revolving credit
loans. 1  These are relatively new forms of consumer credit, and the drafting of
the UCCC presented an opportunity to consider insurance problems connected with
the newer types of consumer credit transactions.
Due to the many similar provisions in the NAIC Model Bill and the UCCC, the
state consumer credit administrator, to be created under the UCCC, will have to be
careful not to infringe on the responsibilities of the commissioner of insurance. The
UCCC calls upon the administrator and the commissioner of insurance to consult and
assist one another in assuring compliance with the insurance provisions. Further,
the UCCC states that joint investigations, suits, and other official actions may be
taken and that the administrator is to notify the commissioner of insurance of any
violation or suspected violation by an insurer.22
The coverage of the CCPA would detract from the UCCC's claim to exclusivity
if it were not for the provision in the former that would exempt transactions in any
state in which local legislation imposing requirements "substantially similar" to the
CCPA is in effect.23 The UCCC is expected to qualify under this provision and to
emerge as the exclusive legal protection for users of consumer credit. In states where
the UCCC is not enacted, the Model Bill and the CCPA may each govern, each im-
posing certain duties on creditors. There appear to be no inconsistencies, however.
B. Amount of Consumer Credit Insurance24
One of the persistent problems in consumer credit insurance has concerned the
sale of insurance in amounts in excess of the indebtedness involved. The initial
" in this way, the following sections of the Model Bill are rendered nugatory: § 8B (requiring
refunds of premiums upon prepayment; compare UCCC § 4.1o8); § 80 (requiring written notice by
the creditor to the debtor in certain circumstances; compare UCCO § 4.105(2)); § 8D (limiting the
creditor's charge to the debtor to the amount of the premium actually paid; compare UCCO § 4.107);
§ ix (requiring the creditor to give the debtor the option of obtaining insurance from another source;
compare UCCC § 4.109). The Model Bill provided no powers of administrative enforcement against
creditors (see § 12), but debtors might have had the benefit of implied rights under the foregoing
provisions. Under the UCCO their sole remedies will be under the Code.
1o See note 19 supra, in which the comparable UCCO provisions are noted. The UCCC provisions
do not, however, track the Model Bill verbatim.
5 1 UCCC §§ 4.107(2), .20(2) (a), .202(2).
2 UCCC § 4.111.
5 CC0PA § 123.
u'It should be noted that the questionable practices described should not be construed as representa-
tive of all insurers and creditors involved in offering consumer credit insurance. The vast majority of
reputable insurers and creditors abhor such practices and actively encourage the drafting and enactment
of such legislatiorf as the Model Bill and the UCCOC.
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amount of credit life insurance under both the UCCC (except for revolving credit
and revolving loan accounts) and the Model Bill is limited to the amount of the
indebtedness, and, if the debt is repayable in installments, the insurance may not
exceed the greater of the scheduled or actual amount of the unpaid debt 5 The
total amount of benefits payable for accident and health insurance is limited to the
total of scheduled unpaid installments of the indebtedness, and the amount of each
periodic benefit is limited to the original indebtedness divided by the number of
periodic installments.26 The UCCC goes further than the Model Bill by specifically
including maximum benefit provisions for consumer credit insurance provided in
connection with a revolving charge account or revolving loan account.27
C. Term of Consumer Credit Insurance
Another reform has concerned the writing of insurance for a term in excess of the
scheduled period of indebtedness. Under ordinary circumstances, both the UCCC
and the Model Bill provide that the commencement date of the insurance is to be
the day the indebtedness is incurred. Each sets the maximum term of the insurance
as not more than fifteen days after the originally scheduled due date of the last
scheduled payment of the debt, unless it is extended without additional cost to the
debtor2 The UCCC adds that the insurance may be extended as an incident to
a deferral, refinancing, or consolidation; in these circumstances the Model Bill appears
to contemplate termination, refund, and new insurance rather than an extension, a
seemingly insubstantial difference.29
D. Fair Disclosure and Evidence of Insurance
Both the UCCC and the CCPA have as a fundamental purpose the disclosure to
credit users of information necessary to making decisions concerning credit terms
and to shopping for better terms with other lenders. In pursuance of this objective,
both would require disclosure of the amount of the insurance premium and the
details as to coverage prior to the extension of credit. These requirements have no
analogue in the provisions of the NAIC Model Bill. Nevertheless, additional dis-
closure problems appear to exist, and they are dealt with in the provisions of both
2
'UCCC § 4.2o(i) (a); MODEL BILL § 4A. It is not as clear as it might be that insurance may
cover accrued interest and associated insurance and other finance charges.
.- UCCC § 4 .202()(b); MODEL BILL § 4B.
2 The maximum benefits from consumer credit insurance that may be provided in connection with
revolving charge or loan accounts are limited to those which "may be reasonably commensurate with
the amount of debt as it exists from time to time." UCCC § 4.202(2). See Buerger, Revolving Credit
and Credit Cards, in this symposium, p. 707, 715.
2 MODEL BILL § 5; UCCC § 4.201(3). The UCCC also contains a special provision limiting the
term on revolving charge or loan accounts by stating that the term "need extend only until the pay-
ment of debt under the account and may be sooner terminated after at least 3o days' notice to the
debtor." UCCC § 4.201(2) (6).
20 UCCC § 4.110; MODEL BILL § 5.
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the UCCC and the Model Bill. The two types of disclosure problems are discussed
separately.
i. Disclosure Prior to the Extension of Credit
In pursuance of the objective of improving the information available to credit
users in the making of their credit decisions, the UCCC and the CCPA require
disclosure of the terms of credit insurance. In some circumstances, however, the
charge for consumer credit insurance is required to be included in the total finance
charge, which includes interest and other items which the creditor may attempt to
tack onto the credit obligation. The question that arises is this: When may the
premium for consumer credit insurance be treated as a separate charge and not in-
cluded in the finance charge?
The conditions that must be satisfied to allow charging a separate premium are
substantially identical under the UCCC and the CCPA. The UCCC states them as
follows:
An additional charge may be made for [consumer credit] insurance . . . if
the insurance coverage is not a factor in the approval by the seller of the extension
of credit and this fact is clearly disclosed in writing to the buyer and if, in order
to obtain the insurance in connection with the extension of credit, the buyer gives
specific affirmative written indication of his desire to do so after written disclosure
to him of the cost thereof.30
When these conditions are not met, the UCCC and the CCPA would both require
the inclusion of the insurance premium in the finance charge for purposes of dis-
closure. The UCCC requires in addition that the insurance charge be included in
the finance charge for the purposes of determining compliance with the ceiling rates
on finance charges established in the Code.3l Thus, if the creditor requires life in-
surance in connection with the loan or credit sale, the creditor will be unable to make
a separate charge for insurance under the CCPA. Under the UCCC, he would find
himself subject to the Code's restrictions on "supervised loans" if the finance charge
(including the insurance charge) exceeds an annual rate of eighteen per cent, and
the Code's absolute rate ceilings for supervised loans would also apply.
2. Disclosure Following the Extension of Credit
Considerable injustice is alleged to have occurred where neither the debtor nor
his next-of-kin were aware of the existence of consumer credit insurance, or where, if
they had knowledge of insurance, they were not fully cognizant of the extent and
the details of coverage. Reforms embodied in the NAIC Model Bill, and subse-
quently in the UCCC, require the delivery to the debtor of the individual policy or,
in the case of group insurance, a certificate of insurance within thirty days after the
8
o UCCC §§ 2.202(2); the parallel provision in the article on loans is UCCC § 3.202(2); compare CCPA
§ zo6(b).
" UCCC § 2.202(2), Comment.
REGULATION OF CONSUMER CREDIT INSURANCE
term of insurance commences.8 The CCPA has no analogous provision, but the
disclosure required prior to the extension of credit would, of course, serve the
purpose of better informing debtors of the amount and extent of their insurance
coverage.
The Model Bill appears to give more attention to the problem of disclosure of
terms and limitations of the insurance than does the UCCC. The UCCC simply
requires the delivery of an individual policy or certificate of insurance to the debtor
within thirty days after the term of the insurance commences. While the content
of the certificate of insurance is not specified in the Code, it is clear that the pro-
vision has reference to the Model Bill's requirement that the insurer deliver such
a certificate, the substance of which is spelled out at length, or the individual policy
to the debtor within thirty days after the indebtedness is incurred. Thus the
insurer's delivery of the policy or a certificate would meet the creditor's obligation
under the UCCC, and the UCCC merely adds a requirement that the creditor is
responsible for the certificate's or policy's delivery and must make sure that the
insurer complies with his obligations under the Model Bill. In a state where the
Model Bill is not in effect, the content of the certificate of insurance required by the
Code would not be clear or could be ascertained only by reference to other state law.
E. Choice of Insurer
The nature of the marketing transaction involving consumer credit insurance
provides the creditor with an opportunity to compel the consumer to purchase the
insurance. To prevent the creditor from forcing the insurance upon the debtor,
the NAIC Model Bill provides that the debtor, if required by the creditor to show
evidence of insurance, has the option of furnishing it through an existing policy or
through a policy purchased elsewhere2 3 The UCCC contains a similar provision but
adds a clause stating that the creditor may for reasonable cause decline the insurance
secured by the debtor;3 4 as noted earlier, the UCCC would supersede the Model Bill
insofar as creditors are concerned.
F. Premiums and Refunds
Consumer credit insurance is marketed by financial institutions or vendors as a
transaction incidental to the main transaction of providing cash loans or sales credit
to finance the purchase of consumer goods or services. The insurance company has
little direct contact with the consumer and relies upon the creditor for most data
pertaining to the insurance transaction. The creditor is usually compensated by
the insurance company for providing the insurance to the debtors. Allegations were
made that in some instances creditors charged debtors higher premium rates than
82UCCC § 4.105; MODEL BILL § 6.
Ia MODEL BILL § xi.
n' UCCC § 4.109.
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the rates for consumer credit insurance charged by insurance companies to creditors.
Further, when the indebtedness was liquidated prior to the scheduled maturity
date and the insurance was terminated, the debtor, in some instances, did not receive
a refund or credit from the creditor.
Reforms contained in the NAIC Model Bill provide that the amount charged
the debtor for insurance may not exceed the premiums charged the creditor by the
insurer, computed at the time the charge to the debtor is made, and must conform
to the rate filed with the insurance department0r The UCCC contains a similar
provision and further specifies procedures for calculating the premium to be charged
the debtor on revolving charge accounts and revolving loan accounts.80 As noted
earlier, the UCCC provision would supersede the Model Bill's apparent coverage of
creditor practices.
The failure to file for refunds of unearned insurance premiums is covered by the
UCCC. Section 4.Io8 requires the creditor promptly to refund or credit to the
debtor any "unearned premium" when a loan or credit sale is prepaid or the in-
surance is provided for a shorter term than originally computed. The Model Bill
contains similar refund requirements but does not specifically state who is responsible
for making the refundV7 Again, enactment of the UCCC would preclude applica-
tion of this requirement to creditors, but in the absence of the Code debtors would
still appear to have a claim to such a refund by the creditor.
The UCCC goes beyond the refund provisions of the Model Bill in specifying that
appropriate refunds are to be made when an insured credit sale or loan is prepaid by
the proceeds of credit insurance."8 Normally, no premium refund would be appro-
priate under these circumstances. However, the UCCC section states,
Upon prepayment in full of a consumer credit sale or consumer loan by the proceeds
of consumer credit insurance, the debtor or his estate is entitled to a refund of
any portion of a separate charge for insurance which by reason of prepayment is
retained by the creditor or returned to him by the insurer ....
Such a refund requirement could arise in the following circumstance: The creditor
charges the debtor the total premium at the time the indebtedness is incurred but
remits only a portion of the premium periodically to the insurer; the debtor then dies
and the indebtedness is prepaid by the proceeds of the insurance before the creditor
has remitted the total premium to the insurer.
G. Creditor Compensation
It is common industry practice for the insurer to compensate the creditor for
marketing and handling consumer credit insurance. The creditor is generally allowed
"'MOmm. BILL §§ 8A, D.
8 UCCC § 4.107.
'7MomEL BLL § § 8B, C.
UCCC § 4.108(1).
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to retain as a commission a percentage of the premiums collected or is granted a
retrospective rate credit or dividend based on its own favorable mortality or morbidity
experience. It is clear that neither the Model Bill nor the UCCC regard such com-
missions or experience credits or dividends as premium refunds which are required
to be returned to debtors. The Model Bill does not contain any reference to such
creditor compensation by the insurer. A proposal for the inclusion of restrictions on
creditor compensation was rejected by the NAIC in 1959. Its rejection was attributed
to a combination of two factors: first, difficulties in explaining to insurance com-
missioners how a percentage limitation on creditor compensation could be enforced,
and second, opposition from representatives of creditors, who felt that a limitation of
compensation to forty per cent of premiums, the percentage which had gained the
greatest support, was too low. 0
Following the defeat of the proposal, certain state insurance departments began
adopting their own regulations governing creditor compensation. The first state to do
so was Nebraska, whose Director of Insurance issued a bulletin which read as
follows:
The Department will approve no rates or policy forms wherein retrospective rate
credits or retrospective commissions are to be paid to lenders based upon favorable
loss experience which can exceed a total commission substantially in excess of 3o/.
Violation of the terms of this letter by admitted companies may be grounds for
immediate disapproval of all credit policy forms and rate schedules by this depart-
ment, or for action against the company license itself.40
Recently, the Director of Insurance of Illinois, in an effort to attain a reasonable rela-
tionship between the benefits of consumer credit insurance and its cost, a matter to be
discussed in a subsequent section of this paper, issued a bulletin and accompanying
letter in which he stated that commissions or compensation payments greater than
forty per cent are excessive and would be deemed a prima facie violation of the fifty
per cent loss ratio, a standard which requires a return to the debtor public of at least
fifty per cent of their premiums in the form of benefits. His rationale for issuing
the bulletin is that compensation in excess of forty per cent cannot contemplate a loss
ratio of fifty per cent or more since administrative costs and other expenses must
also be met.' As of November 1968, eleven state insurance departments have estab-
lished some form of limitation on the amount of compensation payable to creditors
in connection with the sale of consumer credit life and accident and health in-
surance
2
" Doss, Rate Regulation in Consumer Credit Insurance, 528 INS. L.J. i9 (1967).
"Nebraska Bulletin, dated January 15, ig6o, from William E. Grubbs, Director of Insurance, to all
insurers writing consumer credit insurance in the state.
"' Illinois Bulletin, dated October 15, I968, from John F. Bolton, Jr., Director of Insurance, to all
companies issuing credit life insurance or credit accident and health insurance.
4 The states and percentage of creditor compensation permitted are Arizona (37Y2%), Arkansas
(35%), Illinois (40%), Indiana (40%), Michigan (40%), Nebraska (33%%), Nevada (40%), Ohio
(35%), Tennessee (40%), Texas (35%), and Washington (40%).
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While the Model Bill omits to deal with creditor compensation, the UCCC con-
tains a provision relating to the subject in section 4.Io8(2)(c), which pertains to
dividends. This provision states that the creditor is not required to account to the
debtor for any "gain or advantage not prohibited by law" which the creditor may
derive from the sale of such insurance. The official comment relating to this pro-
vision of the UCCC defends this position as follows :43
Subsection (2)(c) of Section 4.io8 permits a creditor to derive from consumer
credit insurance gains and advantages such as dividends and refunds resulting
from favorable mortality or morbidity experience with respect to insured debtors.
The provisions of Article 4 relating to consumer credit insurance are predicated
on the Special Committee's conclusions that:
i. Although the gains and advantages may be large to the creditor, they are
relatively insignificant to each insured debtor and the calculating, clerical and mailing
costs of returning them to insured debtors would be unreasonably disproportionate
to the amounts involved.
2. The requirements of Article 4 that premiums for consumer credit insurance
be reasonable in relation to benefits, if properly enforced by the State insurance
commissioner or superintendent, will preclude the possibility of the use of consumer
credit insurance as a device by creditors for concealing hidden charges from debtors.
The UCCC thus permits the current practice of not passing on experience refunds
to the debtor. In addition, the UCCC sanctions creditor compensation by the in-
surer and denies the debtor any refund because of creditor compensation. It never-
theless suggests that the problem is a proper one for the attention of those responsible
for the regulation of insurance rates. The problem thus merges with those discussed
in the final portion of this paper.
H. Deferrals, Refinancing, or Consolidation
The practice of issuing a new policy to cover an indebtedness which has been
refinanced without cancelling the existing policy and refunding the unearned premi-
um is called pyramiding. The motive for pyramiding is apparent when it is noted
that the creditor receives compensation representing a portion of the premium on
every sale of consumer credit insurance. The NAIC Model Bill provides that if an
indebtedness is discharged by renewal or refinancing prior to maturity, any insurance
in force must be cancelled prior to issuing new insurance. Any unearned premium
on the cancelled insurance is to be refunded. 44
Under the provisions of the UCCC, the creditor may not make a separate charge
for new insurance in connection with a deferral, a refinancing, or a consolidation un-
less all of the following conditions exist:
(a) the debtor agrees that the charge may be made;
"'UCCC § 4.108, Comment.
"'MODEL BiLL S 5.
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(b) the debtor's insurance protection is increased in amount, term or kind over
the insurance provided under the original indebtedness;
(c) the debtor receives a proper refund of the unearned premium on the cancelled
insurance; and




Most of the recognized abusive practices in the consumer credit insurance industry
can be dealt with effectively if the NAIC Model Bill and the UCCC are adopted and
enforced. There is some reason to believe that such practices have been largely
eliminated in those states that have adopted the Model Bill, and enactment of the
UCCC would provide important remedies to debtors and, more importantly, effective
enforcement against creditors who continue to abuse credit insurance. A review of
consumer insurance hearings before state insurance regulatory authorities indicates
that the major efforts of the industry and the regulatory agencies are now primarily
directed toward resolving the issues of premium rate regulation.46 During the recent
hearings on consumer credit insurance held by the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Monopoly, repeated inquiry was made as to the adequacy of the NAIC Model
Bill to deal with the complex problem of rate regulation!'
Both the Model Bill and the UCCC approach the problem of rate regulation in-
directly by requiring the premium charges to be reasonable in relation to the benefits
provided. There is, however, a difference between the Model Bill and the UCCC with
respect to the disapproval of forms by the insurance commissioner. The Model Bill
states that
The Commissioner shall . . . disapprove any such form if the benefits provided
therein are not reasonable in relation to the premium charge, or if it contains pro-
visions which are unjust, unfair, unequitable, misleading, deceptive or encourage
misrepresentation of the coverage... 48
The corresponding provision in the UCCC reads as follows:
Within 3o days after the filing of any form or schedule [of premium rates or
charges], he [the Commissioner] shall disapprove it if the premium rates or
"UCCC 5 4.11o(r).
" See, e.g., Hearings Before the California Department of Insurance (April x967) [hereinafter cited
as California Hearings); Hearings Before the Vermont Department of Banking and Insurance (April
1967) [hereinafter cited as Vermont Hearings]; Hearings Before the Wisconsin Department of Insurance
(October z966).
"Hearings on the Consumer Credit Industry Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 9oth Cong., ist Sess. (x967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on the
Consumer Credit Industry].
'8 MODEL BILL § 7B.
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charges are unreasonable in relation to the benefits provided under the form, or
if the form contains provisions which are unjust, unfair, inequitable, or deceptive,
or encourage misrepresentation of the coverage....4o
The language in the UCCC reflects the drafters' intent to remove any doubt as to
the insurance commissioner's authority to disapprove a premium rate as well as the
power to disapprove a form.50 The former power is not explicitly granted in the
Model Bill, but the lack of explicit power has not prevented premium rate regulation
in a number of states.
Despite the inclusion of this authority in the UCCC, the problem of effective rate
regulation will remain because the insurance commissioner still must decide what
is "reasonable." A review of recent consumer credit insurance hearings reveals a
dichotomy among insurers with respect to the regulation of premium rates for
consumer credit insurance.51 The need for regulation is accepted, but there is no
agreement as to how regulation may be fairly and effectively accomplished. Despite
considerable effort to attain that objective, the issue remains unresolved.
The purpose of this section is to review the different positions on rate regulation.
Because there has been only limited discussion of credit accident and health insurance
premium rates, this section is restricted to the controversy in the regulation of credit
life insurance premium rates.
The two principal propositions regarding rate regulation are (a) the use of the
fifty per cent loss ratio and (b) the establishment of a maximum rate or schedule
of rates.52 The essential distinction between the two regulatory approaches is that
the first defines the maximum rate indirectly by requiring that the insurer's incurred
losses amount to at least fifty per cent of the earned premium, while the second
regulates directly through the establishment of a maximum premium rate.53 Both
types of regulation apply to the premium rate charged the creditor by the insurer.
This, in turn, is the rate the creditor may charge the debtor in states where either the
Model Bill or the UCCC applies.
A. Fifty Per Cent Loss Ratio
As previously noted, the Model Bill authorizes the insurance commissioner to
disapprove a company's policy forms if the benefits provided are not reasonable
in relation to the premiums charged. The NAIC, in I959, adopted a resolution which
UCCC § 4.203 (2).5
o UCCC § 4.203, Comment.
See hearings cited supra note 46.
"The decremental scale is a variation of the maximum rate approach to premium rate regulation.
With the decremental scale, the maximum premium rate which an insurer may charge a particular
creditor is related inversely to the amount of insurance in force for that creditor. Thus, the largest creditors
pay, and in turn charge, the lowest premium rate.
" The term "maximum rate" means the highest rate that may be charged unless an insurer presents
evidence that a higher rate is justified and the insurance commissioner approves the "deviated" higher
rate.
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recommended to all insurance commissioners "that a rate for Credit Life or Credit
Accident and Health [insurance], producing a loss ratio of under 5o% should be
considered to be excessive." 4 In 1966, the NAIC reaffirmed this position by adopting
the so-called "Richmond Resolution," which called for the enforcement of section 7B
of the Model Bill by the use of the fifty per cent loss ratio and the promulgation of
prima facie rates. 5 The fifty per cent loss ratio has been understood to mean that
incurred losses would equal at least fifty per cent of earned premiums. In concept,
when an insurer has developed credible experience under the prima facie rate, the
insurer's premium rate may be adjusted upward or downward if it does not produce
a fifty per cent loss ratio-that is, does not result in the return of fifty per cent of
premiums to the public in the form of benefits. If the prima facie rate produces a
loss ratio in excess of fifty per cent, the insurer may file a request for a deviation to
charge a higher rate. Conversely, if an insurer's loss ratio is less than fifty per cent,
the insurance commissioner may order the insurer either to reduce the pemium rate
or to increase benefits by an amount sufficient to produce a loss ratio of at least
fifty per cent. The insurer is free, of course, to develop a loss ratio exceeding fifty per
cent.
The major argument advanced in favor of the fifty per cent loss ratio is that it
was recommended as a proper rate regulation technique by the NAIC after long
and careful consideration.56 The proponents also believe that the fifty per cent
loss ratio is simple to administer. To provide the necessary data for the enforcement
of the fifty per cent loss ratio, the NAIC has recently adopted reporting forms for
credit life and credit accident and health insurance.5 7  These forms are designed to
give insurance departments information as to the type of coverages, the premium
rates charged, and the loss experience of each insurer writing credit life and credit
accident and health insurance.
Opponents of the fifty per cent loss ratio offer two principal objections: (a) the
loss ratio is too low in comparison with other group insurance, thus permitting too
much of the premium to be absorbed in administrative costs and creditor com-
pensation, and (b) its administration on a case-by-case basis is very burdensome.
In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, spokesmen
for the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States and the Aetna Life
Insurance Company indicated that their companies conduct group credit life in-
surance in much the same way as their other group insurance business.58 In the view
of the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance of the State of Vermont, higher
loss ratios should be developed in group consumer credit insurance since loss ratios
in excess of fifty per cent are developed for other types of group insurance:
I NAIC Ig6o PROCEEDINGS 176.
2 NATC I966 PROCEEDINGS 402.5
oHearings on the Consumer Credit Industry, pt. 3, at 2444.
07, NATC 5967 PRoCEEDINGS s6; 2 id. at 397.
" Hearings on the Consumer Credit Industry, pt. 3, at 2411, 2418.
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To a life insurance actuary, familiar with the efficiency of group life insurance,
the suggestion that 50% is an appropriate loss ratio is upsetting. I know perfectly
well that loss ratios can run as high as 8o%, perhaps 85%, in credit insurance
and still allow the creditor to receive a modest dividend and the insurer to make
a profit.59
Proponents of the fifty per cent loss ratio have denied that there is a substantial
basis for comparing group consumer credit insurance to other forms of group
insurance. For instance, the General Counsel of the Consumer Credit Insurance
Association stated,
I am sure you are well aware of the fact that there are positive and significant
differences [between employer-group life insurance and group credit life insurance].
Just to name a few, there is not a common industry such as is the case of group
employer-employee; we don't have a common employer situation; there is no fluctua-
tion of the rate by age; and there is no participation requirement.00
Insurance regulators have, on occasion, asked how the fifty per cent loss ratio
should be enforced. Their question refers to the evidence that each group policy
issued by an insurer produces a unique mortality cost. If each policy is to generate
a loss ratio of at least fifty per cent, a premium rate must also be established on a
case-by-case basis. If a department does not have the staff to enforce the fifty per cent
loss ratio on that basis (or simply chooses not to do so), the prima facie rate becomes
the rate at which most credit life insurance is written except when a higher rate
can be justified by the insurer and a rate deviation is granted by the insurance
department. The prima facie rate tends to become the minimum rate, as well as a
maximum rate.6 From a practical standpoint, therefore, the establishment of a
"reasonable" prima facie rate involves the same considerations as the establishment
of any other "reasonable" maximum premium rate. Thus, the determination of a
"reasonable" maximum rate is at the heart of the rate regulation controversy.
B. Maximum Premium Rates
As an alternative to the fifty per cent loss ratio, some insurance departments have
promulgated a maximum rate or schedule of rates. If consumer credit insurance
is written at these or lower rates, the insurer is presumed to be charging a reasonable
premium rate.
The two principal views on the matter of establishing maximum premium rates
(prima fade or otherwise) are presented by those who favor a maximum rate per
hundred dollars of installment debt per year 2 of sixty cents or less and those who
' Id., pt. i, at 66.
o Vermont Hearings 2.
"'Hearings on the Consumer Credit Industry, pt. 3, at 2084, 2446; and California Hearings 83.
" All references to specific premium rates are in terms of cents per one hundred dollars of initial
indebtedness repayable in twelve equal monthly installments. To simplify the reading, rates are expressed
in terms of cents only.
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support higher maximum rates of seventy-five cents or more. Some proponents of
the former view argue that on the basis of the claim cost of approximately thirty
cents per one hundred dollars of initial indebtedness developed in the NAIC mor-
tality studies, a fair rate for the "normal" case is sixty cents using the fifty per cent
loss ratio as a benchmark. 3 The logic of their advocacy of lower maximum premi-
um rates is based on the following assumptions: (a) many insurers will charge the
maximum rate allowed even if very low loss ratios are developed, and (b) the
insurer will request a rate deviation if abnormally high mortality expenses are
developed. Based on these assumptions, they argue that the establishment of a
maximum rate which will produce a reasonable loss ratio in the normal case is
preferable to a higher rate, since the insurer will request a rate deviation when a
higher-than-normal rate is justified.
Supporters of the higher maximum rate contend that the NAIC mortality studies
do not demonstrate that an average claims cost of thirty cents is significant for the
purposes of regulation. 4 An insurer may experience higher claims costs as a result
of (a) higher mortality experience of some groups and (b) provision of broader
coverages. The latter point was emphasized by a spokesman for the American
National Insurance Company during testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly. He stated, "I think it is pure conjecture to discuss a
particular rate unless we know what the company was offering for that particular
rate."65 These insurers state that as a result of higher mortality costs, they may be
forced to seek rate deviations in order to operate profitably if low (sixty cents or
less) maximum rates are promulgated. They argue, moreover, that they are some-
times required to exhibit an unusually high loss ratio before they are granted a rate
deviation by the insurance department.6 They favor a higher maximum rate because
it allows them to operate without the necessity of obtaining rate deviations.
V
CONCLUSION
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners, with the aid of responsible
industry representatives, adopted a Model Bill which deals effectively with such
problems in consumer credit insurance as sales of excessive amounts of insurance,
pyramiding of coverages, lack of disclosure, overcharging, coercion, and nonpayment
of claims. The Model Bill also authorizes the insurance commissioner to disapprove
any policy form in which benefits are not reasonable in relation to premiums
charged.
The proposed UCCC includes several sections regulating consumer credit in-
03 Hearings on the Consumer Credit Industry, pt. I, at 72-73.
"* Vermont Hearings 8; California Hearings 233.
( Hearings on the Consumer Credit Industry, pt. 3, at 2151.
"' Vermont Hearings 7; California Hearings 247-48.
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surance that complement some of the provisions of the NAIC Model Bill. In contrast
to the Model Bill, which provided a mechanism only for regulating insurers, the
UCCC is concerned with the conduct of creditors in transactions involving consumer
credit insurance. Thus, the UCCC affords additional safeguards for the consumer,
both through specific remedies made available to him and through an enforcement
mechanism set up to police creditors in his interest.
With regard to charges for consumer credit insurance, both the NAIC Model
Bill and the UCCC provide controls over premium rates indirectly by requiring
reasonable benefits for insured debtors in relation to premium charges. However,
the Model Bill and the UCCC do not specify any standard or approach in deter-
mining a reasonable benefit-cost ratio, and the implementation of the reasonable
benefits language is left to the discretion of the insurance commissioner. The NAIC,
in 1959 and again in the so-called "Richmond Resolution," adopted in 1966, recom-
mended to insurance commissioners the fifty per cent loss ratio for rate supervision,
but the appropriateness of this standard is open to debate. Thus, the determination
of reasonable premium rates remains the most pressing problem in the field of con-
sumer credit insurance.
